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I. NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL
The elements of a valid cause of action in negligence are specifically
enumerated by Justice Holmes of the Tennessee Supreme Court in
the case of Ruth v. Ruth:
1. A duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.
2. A failure on the part of the defendant to perform that duty.
3. An injury to the plaintiff resulting proximately from the defendant's
breach of that duty of care.1
This outline will be used for the treatment of general questions of
negligence, and particular fact situations will then be subsequently
treated.
A. Duty of Care
The Ruth case itself presents what is probably the most important
problem coming within the topic of duty. It poses the question of
whether one who has carelessly placed himself into a position of
danger can be held liable to a would-be rescuer who is injured in
the rescue attempt. When the defendant has endangered a third
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; Advisor to Reporter for RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TORTS.
1. 372 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tenn. 1963), relying on De Glopper v. Nashville Ry. &
Light Co., 123 Tenn. 633, 134 S.W. 609 (1911). The third element, as listed in the
Ruth case is often broken down into two separate parts-causation and damages. See,
e.g., PnossER, TOnTS § 35 (2d ed. 1955).
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party, the cases are in agreement that he is liable to a person attempt-
ing to rescue that party,2 there he breached a duty to the third party.
But in the case where the defendant endangered only himself, early
cases held that he owed no duty to anyone to keep himself safe, and
refused to allow the rescuer to recover.3 In disregarding this technical
argument in the Ruth case,4 the Tennessee court is in accord with
the present majority rule. Modem commentators are in agreement
that the rescuer should be allowed to recover.5
In Howell v. Betts,6 defendants had surveyed a parcel of land in
1934 "for a former owner," plaintiffs purchasing it in 1958. It was
discovered in 1960 that there were errors in the survey so that the size
was less than that shown on the survey. The supreme court treated
the action as one for negligent misrepresentation and regarded the
problem as one of duty. It explained that the old rule requiring
privity of contract no longer applies in Tennessee, and that liability
should extend to a reasonable foreseeable risk of injury to person or
damage to property. The cases are not so clear when the loss is to an
intangible interest of the plaintiff, and the negligent representation
is made not to the plaintiff or for his specific benefit. In the leading
case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,7 the New York court had held
that liability in negligence for misrepresentation did not extend to a
person not in privity unless he was in the immediate contemplation
of the parties.8 Some recent cases have sought to expand the scope
of the duty to make it extend to foreseeable persons and risks. An
important case to this effect is Texas Tunneling Co. v. Chattanooga,9
recently decided by a federal court in Tennessee.10 The instant case, in
holding for the defendant, is not inconsistent with that case or
restrictive of its holding. It regarded the plaintiffs as "unforeseeable"
and laid emphasis on the twenty-four years, saying that to impose
liability here would be to extend it to "any and all purchasers to the
2. The leading decision and classic case is Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y.
176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
3. See, e.g., Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 679, 98 N.W. 500 (1904).
4. Ruth v. Ruth, 372 S.W.2d 285 (Tenn. 1963).
5. For a very good treatment of the problem, see 2 VAND. L. REV. 491 (1949),
commenting on Longacre v. Reddick, 215 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
The holding in the Ruth case has the effect of negating a possible implication in
Dan v. Bryan, 49 Tenn. App. 250, 354 S.W.2d 483 (W.S. 1961), that no duty will
be held to exist in such circumstances. See discussion in Noel, Torts-1962 Tennessee
Survey, 16 Vsm. L. REv. 881, 889-90 (1963).
6. 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962).
7. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
8. Liability was held to be broader in deceit.
9. 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
10. See comment on this case in 16 Vsnm. L. REv. 266 (1962); and in Noel, supra
note 5, at 905-07.
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end of time. We think no duty so broad and no liability so limitless
should be imposed.""
Liability for the wrongful death of an unborn infant was considered
in Durrett v. Owens.'2 Recently, the Tennessee court had followed the
modern rule in holding that a child born alive might recover for
prenatal injuries, and that the action might be maintained even
though the child subsequently died.13 But in Durrett, the court refused
to extend this rule to the case of a stillborn infant, and it thus
reiterated its previous holding in Hogan v. McDaniel.14 Although some
courts have permitted a wrongful death action in the case of a stillborn
child,'5 a majority have declined to permit it. On the whole, the
position which the Tennessee court now follows seems to afford an
appropriate reconciliation of conflicting interests.16
B. Breach of Duty
There is full agreement in the rule that it is the jury's function to
determine whether the defendant has been negligent-that is, has
breached his duty to use care. Numerous cases decided during the
survey period contain specific declarations that the question of
negligence is normally for the jury and will not be taken from their
hands if there is any reasonable basis on which they are to decide.17
1. Standard of Care.-The issue of negligence is submitted to the
jury for its consideration by instructions making use of a standard of
conduct. Normally expressed in terms of what a reasonable prudent
man would do under the same or similar circumstances, this standard
is not a rule of conduct which the jury can apply automatically once
it determines the facts, but its application requires a real exercise of
discretion. As Justice White said in Sneed v. Henderson:
11. 211 Tenn. at 138, 362 SAV.2d at 926.
12. 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963).
13. Shousha v. Matthews Drivuself Service, Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471
(1962).
14. 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
15. E.g., Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955).
16. See Noel, supra note 5, at 892; 30 TENN. L. RiEv. 309 (1963); Notes, 26 TENN.
L. REV. 494 (1959); 8 V, n. L. REv. 521 (1955); 3 VANs. L. RBv. 282, 287 (1950).
17. See, e.g., Price v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 321 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1963);
Nichols v. Herrin Transp. Co., 319 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1963); Ruth v. Ruth, 372
S.W.2d 285 (Tenn. 1963); Sneed v. Henderson, 211 Tenn. 572, 366 S.W.2d 758
(1963); James v. Ross, 369 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962); McFerrin v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 364 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962); Birdwell v. Smith, 364
S.W.2d 944 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962); J. W. Owen, Inc. v. Bost, 364 S.W.2d 499 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1961); Davenport v. Robbins, 370 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963);
Hobbs v. Livesay, 372 S.W.2d 199 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
When there is not sufficient evidence to go to the jury, the court decides as a
matter of law E.g., Ford v. Brandan, 367 S.W.2d 481 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962);
Merrell v. Chickasaw Hotel Co., 50 Tenn. App. 420, 362 S.W.2d 262 (W.S, 1961).
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Ordinary care is a flexible standard which varies with circumstances. Thus
though the instructions to the jury would be the same in both cases, the
standard, for example, places a greater duty on one who is driving on a
wet road at night in a congested area than one who is driving on an open
road on a clear day. Such flexibility is the beauty of this standard.18
The statement of the standard of ordinary care is varied in only a
few types of instances. Occasionally it is relaxed, as in the case of a
minor child 19 or a person with serious physical impairment. With
other types of individuals it may be increased, as in the case of a
common carrier of passengers which in Tennessee is held to the "high-
est degree of care."20
Occasionally the special circumstances of the case will warrant
express mention in the instructions. Two cases involve the "sudden
emergency doctrine." In Ruth v. Ruth,' the supreme court quoted
with approval a statement of the court of appeals "that one who
through the negligence of another, and not through his own negli-
gence, suddenly finds himself in a position of peril and is compelled
to act instantly to avert an injury to himself, is not guilty of negligence
if he makes such a choice as a person of ordinary prudence placed in
such a position might make, even though he did not make the wisest
choice."z2
This expression of the "doctrine" seems much better than that used
in Stacks v. Veteran's Cab Co.,23 and also quoted from earlier Ten-
nessee cases: "One who in sudden emergency acts according to his
best judgment, or who, because of want of time in which to form a
judgment, omits to act in the most judicious manner, is not chargeable
with negligence."2 4 This carries an erroneous implication that the
standard in the emergency situation involves a subjective test ("his
best judgment") rather than an objective one ("person of ordinary
prudence placed in such a position"). As another quotation in the
Stacks case itself indicates, the person's "own judgment.., is not in
any situation, emergency or otherwise, the law's criterion. The driver
is exonerated if the course which he takes in an emergency is one
18. 366 S.W.2d 758, 764 (Tenn. 1963).
19. This is recognized in Ringer v. Godfrey, 50 Tenn. App. 559, 362 S.W.2d 825
(E.S. 1962), where the child was only five years old and was held to be incapable
of negligence as a matter of law.
20. Stacks v. Veteran's Cab Co., 366 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962). On a
carrier of goods, see Wayne Knitting Mills v. Delta Motor Lines, 372 S.W.2d 419
(Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
21. 372 S.W.2d 285 (Tenn. 1963).
22. Id. at 289, quoting from Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Hanson, 18 Tenn. App.
542, 79 S.W.2d 818 (M.S. 1934). The case involved a plaintiff seeking to rescue a
defendant who had gotten himself into a dangerous situation.
23. 366 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
24. Id. at 544, quoting from several Tennessee cases. The sentence came originally
from 20 R.C.L. 29 (1918).
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which might fairly be chosen by an intelligent and prudent person."
It is to be hoped that the opinion of the supreme court in the Ruth
case may now have the effect of eliminating this implicit confusion.
The Stacks case26 raises the interesting question of what is to be
done when there are two conflicting reasons for varying from the
normal standard of the reasonable prudent man. It involved a taxicab
driver, who is subject to the highest degree of care, and it also in-
volved a sudden emergency, when an occupant of a parked car
suddenly opened a door directly in front of the approaching taxi.
The court held that a cab driver is entitled to the benefit of the sudden
emergency doctrine and it did not hold erroneous some instructions
of the trial court which tried to express both ideas at the same time.
It would appear not to be difficult, however, to phrase an instruction
which would say that the cab driver is held to the highest degree of
care under the circumstances and that one of the circumstances to be
considered was the sudden emergency in which he found himself.
2. Negligence Per Se.-Instead of using the general standard of the
reasonable prudent man, courts sometimes announce a specific rule
of conduct. The stop-look-and-listen rule is the classic example.
27
This practice has been followed infrequently in recent years.2 When
there is a criminal or traffic statute in existence, however, the courts
freely adopt the rule of conduct set out in it, and make violation of
that rule negligence per se. The significance of this analysis is that
the court is not compelled by the existence of the criminal statute to
apply it to civil actions. When it does so it is acting of its own free
will, and it may decline to adopt a rule of conduct from an inap-
propriate statute.
2 9
The same reasoning may, of course, be applied to a municipal
ordinance or a significant administration regulation, so that a violation
may be treated as negligence per se. But in Williams v. Tillett
Brothers Construction Co.,30 the federal court felt that the Tennessee
courts would not apply it to specifications in a contract between the
Tennessee Highway Department and a highway contractor. These
25. Ibid., quoting through other cases from 5 Am. Jtm. Automobiles § 171, at 601
(1936). See also, Wade, Torts-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. REv. 1269, 1273
(1960).
26. 366 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
27. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
28. But see Horn v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1962), and the "rule" that an automobile driver must keep his car in "such control
as to be able to stop in time to prevent running into the car ahead in case the latter
vehicle comes to a sudden stop." Id. at 914-15. And compare the Tennessee cases
involving the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule. See Wade, Torts-1954 Tennessee
Survey, 7 VAND. L. REv. 951, 952-53 (1954).
29. See REsTATEmENr (SEcoND), TOnTS § 286 (Tent. Draft. No.,4, 1959).
30. 319 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1963).
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specifications were held not to amount to administrative regulations. 3'
In several cases during the survey period the decision turned on the
interpretation of a statute. Thus, the Child Labor Statute was held
to apply to permitting a boy to work, without a formal employment
contract, so that he could recover when injured in working on a"go-cart," though he obtained no pay and simply received free rides.33
In a right-of-way statute a sled was construed as being a "vehicle."
34
A similar statute was held not to give a right-of-way to a boy on a
bicycle coming out of a private driveway.35
The Pure Food and Drug Act was involved in Walton v. Guthrie,30
but there was held to be no evidence of its violation. The Railroad
Precautions Statute was construed in Baggett v. Louisville & N.R.R.37
Its recent amendment was held to change it from a statute creating
a new, independent cause of action which must be stated in a
separate count, into a "mere common law right of action" which would
not require a separate count but would amount to negligence per se.
In Mead v. Parker,3 an ice cream truck was parked on the wrong
side of the street, and a child was injured in crossing the street to
make a purchase. In accordance with well established authority the
court held that the plaintiff could not base an action on violation
of the ordinance in parking the wrong way. The purpose of the
ordinance was the "prevention of traffic bottlenecks and the collision-
free passage of other vehicles," and not the "protection of pedes-
trians."39
3. Proof of Negligence.-Proof of defendant's breach of duty to use
care is often presented by direct evidence. Sometimes, however,
circumstantial evidence is needed to prove some aspect of the case.
Thus, in Kee v. Hill, ° evidence as to the position of bodies and the
nature of injuries sustained was held sufficient to allow a reasonable
inference as to who was the driver of a car. In Gilreath v. Southern
31. The specifications were held properly admitted in evidence to be considered
by the jury, which held for the defendant. Somewhat in point is a group of three
Tennessee cases declining to treat provisions of a "National Electric Code" as the
equivalent of a statute or ordinance. The indication there was that the provisions of
the "Code" might be considered in evidence, but should not be adopted by the court
as controlling. See Wade, Torts-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1218, 1220
(1957).
32. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-701 to 50-725 (1956).
33. Swift v. Wimberly, 370 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
34. Davenport v. Robbins, supra note 17.
35. James v. Ross, 369 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
36. 50 Tenn. App. 383, 362 S.W.2d 41 (W.S. 1962), 30 TENN. L. REY. 478 (1963).
37. 365 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
38. 221 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
39. Id. at 602. See generally Comment, 30 TENN.. L. REv. 556 (1963).
40. 366 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962), Note, 30 TENN. L. Ray. 671 (1963).
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fy.,41 circumstantial evidence was held adequate to show that de-
ceased was an "obstruction" on the tracks within the terms of the
Railroad Precautions Act. On the other hand evidence that a man
had previously been convicted on charges of drunken and reckless
driving was held not sufficient to prove knowledge by defendant of
his incompetency as a driver, and thus to permit a finding of negli-
gence on defendant's part in letting him borrow an automobile.4
One form of circumstantial evidence goes by the name of res ipsa
loquitur. If the accident is such that it would not ordinarily happen
in the absence of negligence and circumstances were sufficiently with-
in the control of the defendant as to point to him, then a finding of
defendant's negligence is permitted. Three professional negligence
cases raised this problem. Thus, in French v. Fischer,43 where a
surgical sponge was sewed up in the abdomen of a small child, res
ipsa was applicable.44 In Pack v. Nazareth Literary and Benevolent
Institute, Inc.,45 where a hypodermic given in the buttock produced a
sterile abscess and there was testimony that it was "highly unlikely"
that dramamine (which should have been used) would have caused
the abscess but an irritant drug might, the doctrine was again held
applicable.4 But in Thompson v. Methodist Hospital,47 where a new-
born infant contracted a staph infection, the doctrine was held inap-
plicable since this might well have happened in the absence of
negligence.
In Kee v. Hill,8 where a car ran off a road and hit a bridge abut-
ment, res ipsa was held applicable. It was held inapplicable, however,
in an action against the Tennessee Valley Authority.49
C. Causal Relationship Between Injury and Negligence
The case of Gipson v. Memphis Street Ry.,5 raises the issue of
causation in its simplest form. The deceased, while boarding an
electric coach, received an electric shock. Shortly thereafter she be-
came quite ill and was diagnosed as having a brain tumor. An
operation disclosed that it was a malignant, rapidly growing tumor,
41. 323 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1963).
42. Kennedy v. Crumley, 367 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
43. 50 Tenn. App. 587, 362 S.W.2d 926 (W.S. 1962).
44. There was also direct evidence of negligence here.
45. 50 Tenn. App. 540, 362 S.W.2d 816 (E.S. 1962).
46. The court declared that it was unnecessary to decide whether this constituted res
ipsa loquitur or circumstantial evidence but quoted a statement from Judge Felts that
"res ipsa loquitur does not differ from an ordinary case of circumstantial evidence."
id. at 546-47, 362 S.W.2d at 819-20, quoting Sullivan v. Crabtree, 36 Tenn. App.
469, 258 S.W.2d 782 (M.S. 1953).
47. 211 Tenn. 650, 367 S.W.2d 134 (1962).
48. Supra note 40.
49. Fowler v. TVA, 321 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1963).
50. 364 S.W.2d 110 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
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and she died immediately thereafter. The court decided that there was
no credible evidence that the shock produced the tumor or accelerated
her death in any way and held that the lower court was correct in
giving a directed verdict for the defendant. Ordinarily the question
of cause-in-fact is for the jury, but here the evidence did not raise a
jury question.
If the electric shock had accelerated Mrs. Gipson's death, this would
have been sufficient to allow a cause of action, even though the
tumor had already existed. Thus, in McCandless v. Sammons,51 re-
covery was permitted for the aggravation of a pre-existing injury.
The case involved injury to the neck and back from a rear-end
collision.
Haun v. Brown52 provides an appropriate illustration of causa sine
qua non. Defendant may have been driving too fast, but another car
swerved in front of him so suddenly that he could not avoid hitting
it. The court declared that there was "no proof from which it might
reasonably be inferred that if defendant had been going only 45
miles per hour he could have stopped in time to avoid the collision,"
and it affirmed a decision below for the defendant.
The same explanation may also be appropriate for Ringer v. God-
frey,5 3 where a little five-year-old boy suddenly ran in front of defend-
ants car too late for her to do anything. A jury verdict for defendant
may well have been based on the ground that defendant was not
negligent, but it would also be possible that any negligence on her
part was not the cause in fact of the injury. The court below, how-
ever, had instructed that the child could not be found contributorily
negligent because of its age but that his conduct could constitute an
intervening act preventing defendant's conduct from being the proxi-
mate cause. The appellate court, after some discussion, indicates
that a child's act may be an "intervening, independent, efficient
cause .. . [which] will break the causal connection."54
In Brown v. Hudson,5 defendants had rented a dump truck to
defendant's employer. A defective condition was discovered and
decedent climbed under the raised truck bed to try to fix it. It fell
on him, killing him. The court held that the "negligent acts" of
decedent and his employer "superseded and intervened as an inde-
pendent cause which released defendants as a matter of law."'56 For
this position it relied upon the Tennessee case of Ford Motor Co. v.
51. 50 Tenn. App. 413, 362 S.W.2d 259 (W.S. 1961).
52. 50 Tenn. App. 510, 362 S.W.2d 802 (E.S. 1962).
53. 50 Tenn. App. 559, 362 S.W.2d 825 (E.S. 1962).
54. Id. at 565-66, 362 S.W.2d at 828.
55. 50 Tenn. App. 658, 363 S.W.2d 505 (M.S. 1962).
56. Id. at 669, 363 S.W.2d at 510.
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Wagoner.57 That case, however, involved the intervening act of a third
party rather than the plaintiff himself; perhaps the holding for the
defendant in the instant case is made easier by the thought that
plaintiff may be treated as guilty of proximate contributory negligence.
At any rate the problem of shifting responsibility from one person to
another is one of the most difficult ones in the field of proximate
cause.5
D. Contributory Negligence
As with defendants' negligence, the question of contributory negli-
gence is normally for the jury. 9 Occasionally it is so clear, however,
that the court rules as a matter of law. This was so in Walters v. Kee,
60
where plaintiff went to sleep in the back seat of a car, knowing that
the driver was also very sleepy.
In two cases the unique Tennessee doctrine of remote contributory
negligence was used to diminish the amount of damages, 61 and in
another case reference was made to the doctrine.6
The case of Howard v. Dewey Motor Co.63 involved imputed con-
tributory negligence. Two car salesmen for a common employer
were test driving a trade-in car when it collided with defendant's car.
The court held that the salesmen were engaged in a joint venture, so
that the negligence of the driver was imputed to the other salesman
in an action against the defendant.
64
The relationship of the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk is treated briefly in Walters v. Kee.65 The court
explains that while they are two separate defenses, "there are situa-
tions where the two defenses overlap," in which case the distinction
between them "is not very clear," with "many Courts using the terms
interchangeably."
66
57. 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946).
58. See generally, RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TORTS § 452 (Tent. Draft. No. 9,
1963).
59. Williams v. Kitchin, 316 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1963); Martin v. McMinnville, 369
S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962); Birdwell v. Smith, 364 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1962).
60. 366 S.W.2d 534 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962), 30 TENN. L. REv. 671 (1963).
61. Still v. Townsend, 311 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1962); Cline v. United States, 214
F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
62. Birdwell v. Smith, supra note 59. On remote contributory negligence see gen-
erally, Comment, 22 TN. L. REv. 1030 (1953).
63. 50 Tenn. App. 631, 363 S.W.2d 206 (W.S. 1961).
64. The trend in recent years is toward narrowing the application of imputed
negligence. In addition, the total concept of joint enterprise has been subjected to
much criticism. See generally, PRossER, ToRTs §§ 54, 65 (2d ed. 1955).
65. Supra note 47.
66. Id. at 538. See also Campbell v. Hoffman, 371 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1963), where the court quotes another opinion to the effect that frequently "the dif-




A. Traffic and Transportation
A good majority of the cases decided during the survey period have
involved some aspect of traffic or transportation. No unique problems
of unusual significance have been presented, however, and many of
the traffic cases have been cited and discussed above in the general
treatment of negligence.
Cases frequently involved car collisions.67 Cars sometimes left the
road,68 or struck pedestrians.e Others involved a collision with a
bicycle,70 a sled,71 and a tractor-trailer. 72 Some were actions by a
passenger against a driver;73 one of these involved a sudden stop.7 4
There were cases involving liability for lending a car to an incompetent
person75 and the presumption of agency.76 One case involved injury
from a "go-cart,"7 and another injury while using water skis;78 the
latter was held subject to admiralty rules.
The high degree of care required of a common carrier of passengers
was involved in one case;79 and the responsibility of a carrier of goods
in another. 80
Two cases involved the Railroad Precautions Statute, one before8'
and the other after82 the 1959 amendment. 3 The second case discusses
in detail the effects of the amendment, and concludes that they "are
expression." Id. at 182. This case involved a licensee on premises, and assumption of
risk is also mixed up with a holding that there was no breach of duty to the plaintiff.
See generally, Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22
LA. L. REv. 5 (1961).
67. E.g., Cline v. United States, supra note 61 (three-car collision); Hobbs v.
Livesay, 372 S.W.2d 199 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963); Horn v. Commercial Carriers, Inc.,
supra note 28 (several cars); McCandless v. Sammons, supra note 51 (rear end); Haun
v. Brown, supra note 52.
68. E.g., Kee v. Hill, supra note 40.
69. E.g., Ringer v. Godfrey, supra note 53; J. W. Owen, Inc. v. Bost, supra note 17;
Mead v. Parker, supra note 38.
70. James v. Ross, supra note 35; Keenan v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 603 (E.D.
Tenn. 1963).
71. Davenport v. Robbins, supra note 17.
72. Nichols v. Herrin Transp. Co., supra note 17.
73. Still v. Townsend, supra note 61.
74. Stacks v. Veteran's Cab Co., 366 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
75. Kennedy v. Crumley, supra note 42.
76. Caldwell v. Adams, 367 S.W.2d 804 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
77. Swift v. Wimberley, 370 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
78. King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
79. Stacks v. Veteran's Cab Co., supra note 74.
80. Wayne Knitting Mills v. Delta Motor Lines, 372 S.W.2d 419 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1962).
81. Gilreath v. Southern Ry., 323 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1963). The question was
whether the deceased was an "obstruction" on the tracks so as to make the statute
applicable.
82. Baggett v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 37.
83. TEN2r. CODE ANN. §§ 65-1208, -1209 (Supp. 1963).
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substantive in character and reduce causes of action arising out of
violation of the Statutory Precautions Act to mere common law rights
of action."8
B. Landowners
Toward an invitee (sometimes called a business guest) a landowner
owes a duty to use reasonable care to make his premises safe. Two
cases involved this principle, but in both the holding was for the
defendant. In Merell v. Chickasaw Hotel Co.,85 a hotel guest, starting
to enter a restroom, fell when the door suddenly opened throwing him
off balance. It was held that there was not sufficient proof of negli-
gence to go to the jury. In Ford v. Brandan,8 6 defendants operated
an amusement park containing twelve trampolines. Plaintiff, a teen-
age boy, was pushed by a companion and was seriously injured as a
result. Defendants had an attendant, and plaintiff failed to introduce
evidence showing "that defendants knew or should have known that
horseplay of a nature which caused one of their patrons to be injured
was being carried on." A directed verdict for defendant was affirmed.
One who does not attain to the level of invitee is not entitled to
claim a full duty to use care to make the premises safe. In Phillips v.
Bush,87 plaintiff, a young boy trying to sell handmade potholders at
an apartment house, discovered a dynamite cap on the premises, took
it away, and was injured. The court held that as a door-to-door sales-
man he was not an invitee but a mere licensee. It held that there was
no breach of duty toward him in failing to remove the cap, and a
directed verdict for the defendant was proper. In reaching this result
the court repeated again a statement frequently found in the Tennes-
see cases that a defendant owes to a licensee "no duty except to
refrain from willfully injuring him or from committing negligence so
gross as to amount to willfulness."88 Though the actual holding is
justified, the quotation is quite unfortunate. It gives an erroneous
impression as to the state of the law when it was first pronounced,8 9
and it is clearly out of accord with the vast weight of the authority
84. 365 S.W.2d at 904. See Noel, Torts-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV.
1350, 1361-63 (1959).
85. 50 Tenn. App. 420, 362 S.W.2d 262 (W.S. 1961).
86. 367 S.W.2d 481 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
87. 50 Tenn. App. 639, 363 S.W.2d 401 (E.S. 1961).
88. Id. at 644, 363 S.W.2d at 403, quoting Smith v. Burks, 43 Tenn. App. 32, 37,
305 S.W.2d 748 (M.S. 1957).
89. Some of the earlier cases in the United States used language like this. Perhaps
the leading case in Tennessee is Westborne Coal Co. v. Willoughby, 133 Tenn. 257,
180 S.W. 322 (1915). The opinion there used similar language but also contained




in the United States at the present time.90 It is to be hoped that an
opportunity will arise some time soon for the state supreme court to
consider the state of the authorities within and outside Tennessee and
to prepare a statement which will be less misleading and more in
accord with modem understanding of the rule.
In Campbell v. Hoffman,91 plaintiff, finding the door to her dentist's
office locked, went in another door to private portions of the same
building seeking another way into the office. She caught her heel
on a slight elevation on a step, fell and was injured. The court
thoroughly nailed down a holding for the defendant by holding (1)
that there was no evidence of negligence even if the plaintiff was an
invitee, (2) that plaintiff was not an invitee but only a licensee in this
part of the building and was therefore owed no duty "except to refrain
from willfully or wantonly injuring her," and (3) the action was
barred by both contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Little
point is therefore seen in discussing any single one of these holdings.
The courts are agreed that even less duty is owed to a trespasser
than to a licensee. An exception to this lies in the case of trespassing
children, where the doctrine of attractive nuisance has developed.
The doctrine was involved in the case of Pirtle v. Hart's Bakery,92
where a 14-year-old boy was playing with others in the back of a
bakery, having slipped in past a locked screen door. He crawled
into an oven, and the shelves were revolved, with the result that he
was crushed. The court held as a matter of law that this was not an
attractive nuisance since the place had been locked, but added that
there was also no evidence of negligence on defendant's part.93 In
Mead v. Parker, the court held that the doctrine of attractive
nuisance did not apply to an ice cream truck parked on the street.95
The duty of care owed by a landlord to a tenant is considered in
the case of Sneed v. Henderson,96 where the landlord's maintenance
man made what the jury found was a negligent repair job on a
90. See RESTATENMENT, TORTS §§ 341, 342 (1934); 2 HARPER AND JAIES, Tonrs §§
27.8-27.11 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 77 (2d ed. 1955). As to the condition of
premises, the duty is to use reasonable care to warn of (or to make safe) known latent
dangerous conditions, and to warn of any change in the conditions which would be
dangerous to the licensee and which he might reasonably be expected not to discover.
As to active conduct, the duty is to use reasonable care to discover the licensee and
in carrying on the activity. Very few states today continue to use language like that
quoted above.
91. 371 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
92. 372 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 339 (Tent. Draft. No. 5, 1960). The
amendment to the old section adds a requirement of negligence.
94. 221 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
95. On trespassing children in general, see Noel, The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
in Tennessee, 21 TENN. L. RFv. 658 (1950).
96. 211 Tenn. 572, 366 S.W.2d 758 (1963).
[VOL. 171184
refrigerator, with the result that the tenant was asphyxiated. A jury
verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.
97
In McFerrin v. Crescent Amusement Co.,98 defendant changed the
sidewalk in front of its premises by installing terrazo paving. Plaintiff
slipped on the surface when it was wet, and was hurt. The court
held that a jury question was raised as to whether the defendant was
negligent, and the court below was in error in directing a verdict.
C. Professional Services
Perhaps a trend is indicated by the fact that there were six cases
this year involving actions against doctors or hospitals. Recovery
was approved or seemed indicated in five of them.
In Methodist Hospital v. Ball,99 a boy was brought into the emer-
gency room of the hospital as one of several victims of an accident.
There was testimony that he was not properly examined but was
accused of being drunk. When he asked for treatment, he was
strapped to the stretcher and shipped to another hospital. He died
within fifteen minutes upon reaching the second hospital, with serious
injuries, including a lacerated liver. There was testimony that the
method of holding him and lashing him to the stretcher may well
have exacerbated his injuries and that he might have recovered if
given prompt treatment by defendant. A jury verdict for plaintiff was
affirmed, subject to a remittitur.
In French v. Fischer,"" a surgical sponge was left in the abdomen
of an 18-day-old infant, following an operation. The doctor sent the
circulating nurse out of the room during the operation and this
prevented a double check on the number of sponges. A jury verdict
for plaintiff was affirmed.
In Wooten v. Curry,110 the defendant performed a hysterectomy on
the plaintiff, allowed her to return home and did not have her back
for a check-up for six weeks. It was then discovered that adhesion
had developed in the wall of the vagina, so that it was practically
closed. The doctor was quoted as saying that "he did not know why
plaintiff was in this condition; that he did not intend for it to happen
'and if he had examined her sooner he would have seen it."' A di-
rected verdict for the defendant was reversed and a jury trial in-
dicated.
97. On the landlord's duty generally, see Noel, Landlord's Tort Liability in Tennessee,
30 TENN. L. REv. 368 (1963).
98. 364 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
99. 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (W.S. 1961).
100. 50 Tenn. App. 587, 362 S.W.2d 926 (W.S. 1962), 30 TENN. L. REV. 666
(1963).
101. 50 Tenn. App. 549, 362 S.W.2d 820 (E.S. 1961).
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In Pack v. Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Institution, Inc.,0 2 plain-
tiff was given a hypodermic of what was supposed to be dramamine
in the buttock. It caused excruciating pain, all down the leg, and a
sterile abscess developed. There was testimony that dramamine was
not known to produce these results, and that the most likely cause
was the injection of some irritant. A directed verdict for the defendant
was held in error, as a case of res ipsa loquitur was established.
In Thompson v. Methodist Hospital,103 a newborn baby developed
an infection known as staphylococcus aureus while in the hospital,
and transmitted it to the parents. There was testimony that the
infection was in the several Memphis hospitals at the time and that
extreme care was used. The supreme court affirmed the action of
the court of appeals in setting aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff
and dismissing the action. 104
The liability of a surveyor is considered in Howell v. Betts.10 5 He
had made an error in a survey and description of land. Liability was
held not to extend to "an unforeseeable and remote purchaser 24 years
after the survey."
Negligence in the rendering of a service was found in Price v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co.,06 where it was contended that a tire re-
capper had misaligned a lock ring in an inflated truck tire. The court
affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, holding that questions of
negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury.
In Williams v. Tillett Brothers Construction Co.,10 7 an action was
brought against a highway contractor for alleged negligence in failing
to guard or warn of an excavation. The court held that failure to
comply with contract specifications did not constitute negligence per
se, and a jury verdict for the defendant was affirmed.
D. Suppliers
In Walton v. Guthrie,108 defendant, operator of a drive-in restaurant,
sold plaintiff a barbecued ham hock. Plaintiff and his wife ate it after
driving away, and the plaintiff became violently ill within the hour.
His illness was diagnosed as "gastro enteritis due to food poisoning
of an undetermined type." There was medical testimony as to types
102. 50 Tenn. App. 540, 362 S.W.2d 816 (E.S. 1962).
103. 211 Tenn. 650, 367 S.W.2d 134 (1962).
104. On the general subject of malpractice suits, see McCoid, The Care Required of
Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549 (1959). This is one article in a symposium
on professional negligence, and it is also found in PROFESSIONAL NEGL NCE. 13
(Roady & Anderson 1960).
105. 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962).
106. 321 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1963).
107. 319 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1963).
108. 50 Tenn. App. 383, 362 S.W.2d 41 (W.S. 1962), 30 TENN. L. REv. 478
(1963).
of food poisoning, with indication that it could not have been
salmonella (which customarily originates in cooked foods) since it
would not cause illness until eight to twenty-four hours after inges-
tion, and that staphylococcic food poisoning, while it may manifest
itself within one to four hours, usually does not originate in foods
which are kept hot and normally produces an active illness of only
one day, rather than the three-day illness which plaintiff incurred.
There was also considerable testimony as to the care with which the
food was barbecued and kept, and the high rating of the restaurant.
The lower court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the court
of appeals affirmed.
As to the negligence count, the court found that there was no
evidence of negligence which could be submitted to the jury. Though
it did not speak of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it obviously did
regard it as applicable. A second negligence count was based on the
Pure Food and Drug Act. Violation of this act has been previously
held to constitute negligence per se,109 but the court held this inap-
plicable "because there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record
that said ham hock was adulterated or contained deleterious in-
gredients."" 0
A third count was based on implied warranty, and the court might
have handled it on the same basis as the Food Act by saying that
there was no proof that the food was unwholesome. Instead, it relied
upon the unreported supreme court opinion of Pettricelli v. Green,"'
holding that the supplying of food to be eaten on the premises does
not amount to a sale but the rendering of a service, so that an implied
warranty does not apply. This is quite unfortunate, since this rule,
whatever its original early historical basis when an innkeeper did not
sell food but "uttered" it with the lodging of the person and stabling
of the horse, is now in a distinct minority," 2 with the trend away from
it." 3 It is to be hoped that the statement will subsequently be treated
as dictum, since the court felt that there was no evidence of
109. 'white v. East Tennessee Packing Co., 15 CCH NEC. CAs. 186 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1947), aff'd, 15 CCH NEG. GAs. 272 (Tenn. 1947). Neither case was officially
reported. Cf. Jones v. Mercer Pie Co., 187 Tenn. 322, 214 S.W.2d 46 (1948).
110. 50 Tenn. App. at 392, 362 S.W.2d at 44.
111. Pettrucelli v. Green (Tenn. 1925), unreported opinion cited and described in
Bell v. Bowers Stores, Inc., 3 Tenn. App. 590, 598 (W.S. 1926).
112. The statement in the Walton case that Pettrucelli v. Green "adopted the
ruling of the weight of authority in this country" is in error.
113. For full treatment see DicKERsoN, PRoDucTs Lr nrry AND THE FOOD CON-
suiER §§ 3.1, 3.2 (1951); FsumEn AkN F=IDMAN, PoDucTs LABILrY §§ 24.01,
24.02 (1960); 2 HARPER AND JAmES, ToRTs 1577 (1956) ("Some courts still apply
this quaint concept .... Others more realistic than antiquarian, find a sale and imply




unwholesomeness, and that Tennessee can soon be in accord with
the modem majority rule.114
Tracy v. Finn Equipment Co.,"5 involved an injury sustained from
a mulching machine manufactured by defendant. The trial court left
to the jury the questions as to whether there was negligence in the
design of the machine and whether the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent; and the appellate court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff."'
In Brown v. Hudson,"7 defendant bailed a defective dump truck,
and decedent was killed trying to repair it, having crawled under the
raised truck bed. The opinion properly indicates that the bailor is
under duty to exercise reasonable care to see that the article is in
safe condition, but it holds that when the defect has been discovered
by the bailee and he deliberately and negligently subjects himself to
the danger involved his action cuts off liability.
Kennedy v. Crumley," 8 holds that it is negligence to bail an auto-
mobile to an incompetent driver and that the bailor can be liable to
a third party. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was reversed, however,
because it was not shown that defendant knew of the bailee's
incompetency.
Fowler v. Tennessee Valley Authority,"9 involved the liability of a
supplier of electricity. It was held that there was no negligence. On
the other hand, in Martin v. McMinnville,'20 a distributor was held




Several cases involved actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which permits recovery against the Federal Government if a private
person would be liable in negligence, subject, of course, to certain
exceptions.
In Cline v. United States,12' a mail carrier suddenly came out into
the highway in front of a car, causing a three-car collision; liability
114. There is a good comment on the Walton case in 30 TENN. L. REv. 478 (1963).
115. 310 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1962).
116. See generally, Noel, Products Liability of a Manufacturer in Tennessee, 22 TENN.
L. REV. 985 (1953); and see Noel, Manufacturers Negligence of Design or Directions
for Use of a Product, 71 Y-AE L.J. 816 (1962).
117. 50 Tenn. App. 658, 363 S.W.2d 505 (M.S. 1962), 30 TENN. L. REv. 663
(1963).
118. 367 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962), 30 TENN. L. REv. 658 (1963). See
also, Caldwell v. Adams, 367 S.W.2d 804 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962), involving applica-
tion of a presumption of agency.
119. 321 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1963).
120. 369 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962), 31 TENN. L. REv. 275 (1964).
121. 214 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)
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was imposed. In Keenan v. United States,122 there was a collision
between a mail truck and a bicycle; it was held that the truck driver
was not negligent.
Stratton v. United States,12 announces that the "general rule in
Tennessee is that negligence, to be actionable, must result in damage
to the plaintiff which the defendant could reasonably have anticipated
or foreseen." 124 It adds that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not
impose strict liability upon the government for extrahazardous activ-
ities, and that the government was not liable for negligence of an
employee of a corporation to which it had entrusted a governmental
center. A similar point was involyed in Mahoney v. United States,
125
where the court spoke not of strict liability for ultrahazardous activ-
ities but of nondelegable duties. It suggested that recovery might be
possible on this basis; but in a later hearing it found that the plaintiffs
had failed to prove that their illnesses were produced by radiation or
toxic gases. 12
B. Joint Tortfeasors
In O'Rear v. Oman Constr. Co.,27 a covenant not to sue given to
one joint tortfeasor was held not to release the other. If the second
tortfeasor had been liable only derivately, as principal for the other,
the court indicates, he would have been released, but here there was
independent liability. Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v. Luste'
28
holds that inconsistent judgments cannot stand.
In Chamberlain v. McCleary,12 9 contribution was not allowed
against the husband of the original plaintiff because of his immunity.
In Roberson v. Bitner,130 indemnity was allowed. Three other cases
involved attempts to set aside a release on the ground of mistake or




Sneed v. Henderson,13  holds that an illegitimate child can maintain
a wrongful death action for the death of her mother. Anderson v.
122. 217 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
123. 213 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
124. Id. at 560.
125. 216 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
126. Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
127. 210 Tenn. 651, 362 S.W.2d 217 (1962).
128. 371 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963).
129. 217 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
130. 221 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
131. Short v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (fraud);
Warren v. Crockett, 211 Tenn. 173, 364 S.W.2d 352 (1962) (mistake), 31 TENN. L.
REv. 259 (1964); Collier v. Walls, 369 S.W.2d 747 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962) (mistake).
132. See Reed, Restitution-1963 Tennessee Survey, 17 VAND. L. REV.*** (1964).
133. 211 Tenn. 572,366 S.W.2d 758 (1963).
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Anderson,13 holds that a father is entitled to recover under the statute
although he had abandoned the deceased.
D. Nuisance
In McFerrin v. Crescent Amusement Co.,'3 where a theater owner
used terrazo for paving a part of the sidewalk in front, the question of
whether this created a nuisance was held to be for the jury.
134. 211 Tenn. 566, 366 S.W.2d 755 (1963).
135. 364 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
